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Abstract In recent years, Botnets have been adopted as a
popular method to carry and spread many malicious codes
on the Internet. These malicious codes pave the way to
execute many fraudulent activities including spam mail,
distributed denial-of-service attacks and click fraud. While
many Botnets are set up using centralized communication
architecture, the peer-to-peer (P2P) Botnets can adopt a
decentralized architecture using an overlay network for
exchanging command and control data making their
detection even more difficult. This work presents a method
of P2P Bot detection based on an adaptive multilayer feed-
forward neural network in cooperation with decision trees.
A classification and regression tree is applied as a feature
selection technique to select relevant features. With these
features, a multilayer feed-forward neural network training
model is created using a resilient back-propagation learn-
ing algorithm. A comparison of feature set selection based
on the decision tree, principal component analysis and the
ReliefF algorithm indicated that the neural network model
with features selection based on decision tree has a better
identification accuracy along with lower rates of false
positives. The usefulness of the proposed approach is
demonstrated by conducting experiments on real network
traffic datasets. In these experiments, an average detection
rate of 99.08 % with false positive rate of 0.75 % was
observed.
Keywords P2P Bot  Multilayer neural network 
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1 Introduction
Internet services are increasing in popularity, and many
new online services appear every day. The use of online
services leads to a massive volume of online financial
transactions, where sensitive information is exchanged via
the Internet. The attacker’s interest is converted from
curiosity to financial benefit. Attackers use different mal-
ware to achieve their goals. Among the various forms of
malware, Botnet is considered to be the most serious means
for conducting online crime [1]. However, financial profit
is the goal of Botnets creation and development by attacker
[2].
A Botnet is a network of compromised computers (Bots)
remotely managed by an attacker (Botmaster). A Botnet
can be ordered to perform various malicious activities, such
as sending spam emails, phishing, click fraud, DDoS and
spreading malicious software. To effectively administer a
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Botnet, the Botmaster constructs an infrastructure of a
communication channel to send commands to the Bots and
to receive results from them [3]. This communication
channel is known as the command and control (C&C)
channel. The main difference between a Botnet and other
malware is the infrastructure used in the C&C [4]. In
contrast to other malware that is used to perform malicious
behaviour individually, a Botnet works as a group of
infected hosts based on the C&C communication channel.
A Botnets network can be classified into two main cate-
gories based on the C&C infrastructure: centralized and
decentralized C&C [5]. In centralized Botnets, the Bot-
master normally uses the C&C server to send a command
to the Bots as shown in (Fig. 1a).
Due to its simplicity, the centralized Botnet is widely
used by many Botnet families. The most famous approa-
ches are the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Botnet. However, the main
limitation of the centralized Botnet is its single point of
failure C&C server. A shutdown of the C&C server would
result in the loss of communication between the Bots and
the Botmaster [6]. In order to avoid the weakness of a
single point of failure, Botnet attackers have recently
started to build Botnets based on decentralized C&C
infrastructures such as the P2P Botnet [7] and P2P model
was adopted by many types of Botnet, e.g. Storm Bot,
Conficker Bot and Waledac Bot [8].
A P2P Botnets are a new class that has replaced the old
centralized IRC/HTTP-based Botnet to avoid a single point
of failure and avoid detection during C&C connection. Due
to the distributed network structure of P2P systems, all
peers in the network work as a Bot (client) and C&C
(server) at the same time. In this case, the Botmaster plays
the main role by sending commands to any infected peers
to execute any order or requesting information at any time
(see Fig. 1b).
The life cycle of the P2P Botnet consists of four primary
phases, namely: initial infection, peer propagation, sec-
ondary injection and attack [7]. Firstly, Bot code is created
to insert on an end-user computer by different techniques
such as web download, vulnerability exploitation, mail
attachments, automatically scan, exploit and compromise,
traditional file-based viruses [9]. Secondly, the Bot tries to
connect with other Bots on infected hosts based on its own
hard-coded peer list. Thirdly, the Bot downloads the latest
update of the Bot code through the C&C channel, which
will update it for future tasks. In this phase, a host is
considered to be a Bot in Botnet network. Finally, the Bot
initiates malicious activities such as spam or phishing
emails, distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS),
stealing information and scanning activities.
Despite many research efforts, the P2P Botnet detection
remains a significant challenge for the researchers. Firstly,
the traffic of P2P Botnet is similar to normal traffic; and
secondly, many P2P Botnets, such as Storm and Waledac,
use encryption algorithms that make methods based on
packet inspection ineffective. Furthermore, there is no
central server in P2P Botnets and in addition Bots contact
other peers using random ports [10].
The main aim of this research is to develop P2P Bot
detection approach based on traffic reduction technique.
The approach proposed in this research has the following
characteristics. It detects Bots during the propagation phase
before any malicious action has been taken. Furthermore, it
does not require deep packet inspection (DPI) analysis for
signature matching and does not need to analyse the entire
network traffic. It detects Bots independent of port num-
bers, IP addresses and host characteristics. In summary, we
made the following contributions:
• A network traffic reduction approach that has been
designed will be able to increase the performance of the
proposed framework.
• A connection-based detection mechanism is indepen-
dent of payload and uses only the information obtained
from the header of TCP control packet. Thus, it does
not need deep packet inspection and cannot be confused
with payload encryption techniques.
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• Adopting the classification and regression trees to
select the important connection features in order to
decrease the size and dimensionality of the dataset.
• Detection of P2P Bot traffic on the network and
discriminating it from legitimate network traffic.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews work relevant to P2P Botnet detection
approaches. The proposed approach is then described in
Sect. 3. Section 4 presents the experimental results, and
finally the conclusions and suggestions for future work are
presented in Sect. 5.
2 Relevant work
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in
techniques for Bot detection and prevention. While it may
be important to learn how a Bot infects the computers, it
is more critical to detect the infected machine before it is
exploited to launch malicious activities. Several approa-
ches to detect Botnets have been developed. These
approaches can be classified into signature-based, anom-
aly-based, DNS-based and data mining techniques [11].
Another researchers such as Han et al. [5] classified P2P
Botnet detection systems into three general types: data
mining, machine learning and network behaviour and
traffic analysis. What is more, Zeidanloo et al. [12] in
their research classify the Botnet detection system as
honeynets or intrusion detection systems (IDS) and also
divided the IDS system into three subgroups as following:
anomaly-based, specification-based and signature-based.
In addition, the Botnet detection system can be classified
based on the installation point as a host-based, network-
based and hydride systems. Lu et al. [3] have classified
the Botnet detection techniques on the basis of machine-
learning type supervised and unsupervised Botnets
detection.
A recent study in the field of P2P Botnet detection by
Babak et al. [13] proposed PeerRush, which uses a one-
class classification approach to classify various types of
normal and abnormal P2P traffic. One-class classifier
including KNN, Parzen and Gaussian data description
classifiers [14] is used. An application profile is initially
created by learning traffic samples of known P2P appli-
cations. Moreover, features such as interval delays between
packets and flow duration are used to classify P2P appli-
cations. This approach achieves high accuracy rate in
classifying P2P applications depending on the features
selected. On the other hand, this method does not show
clearly how to detect P2P Botnet, and also detection can be
easily avoided by changing the delay between packets.
In [15], Garg et al. presented a several machine-learning
algorithms such as nearest neighbour, Naive Bayes and
J48. These have been analysed for the detection of P2P
Botnets using various network traffic features. The results
show that the accuracy of the classifiers trained using the
nearest neighbour and J48 is good. However, the detection
of legitimate traffic is very weak.
Jiang and Shao [16] present a method that focuses on the
C&C traffic of P2P Bots regardless of how they perform
their malicious activity. This method develops a detection
mechanism based on a Bots which exhibit connection flow
dependency with other Bots. According to the flow
dependency behaviour, this approach uses single-linkage
hierarchical clustering mechanism to differentiate between
P2P Bots and normal hosts. This method was built based on
the similarity of Botnet traffic, so this approach will fail to
detect the Botnet, which uses the irregularity of traffic flow
such as Storm Bot [17]. Furthermore, it has a limitation to
identify individual Bot behaviour.
EFFORT [18] is a host-based detection approach
which collects information related to Bot’s characteris-
tics at client and network level. It then correlates Bot-
related information by monitoring local computer
activity such as keystrokes and connections with other
computers. The main advantage of this method is that it
does not depend on protocol and communications
topology. In addition, it is able to detect Bots that are
using encryption techniques to hide the malicious
behaviour. The major limitations of this method are
critical to evasion techniques such as fast-flux, and it
cannot prove as real-time detection approach.
Masud et al. [19] introduced an approach to Botnet
detection based on the observation that a Bot has many
reaction patterns which are different from those of
humans. This method can detect Bots by correlating
incoming packets with outgoing packets, new outgoing
connections and application start-ups in hosts. Several
machine-learning algorithms such C4.5 decision tree,
support vector machine, Naive Bayes, Bayes network
classifier and boosted decision tree [20] were compared
and evaluated in the detection of IRC Botnet. The result
of the classifiers evaluation shows that all machine-
learning algorithms achieve 95 % detection rate, less than
3 % false positive rate and under 5 % false negative rate.
The greatest overall performances were reached by a
boosted decision tree. However, one major drawback of
this approach is that it cannot detect Botnets that use
encrypted communication because it needs to access the
content of the payload packets. On the other hand, the
method has been tested on IRC Bots, therefore its ability
to detect modern types of malware such as P2P Bots is
not known.
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Zhang et al. [21] introduced a P2P Botnet detection
system that can identify stealthy P2P Botnets. The pro-
posed approach focuses on identifying Bots based on the
monitoring of C&C traffic. They extract four features for
each traffic flow including the number of bytes received
and sent and number of packets received and sent. Hier-
archical clustering [22] and BIRCH algorithm [23] are used
to cluster network flow. Furthermore, the approach is
independent of payload signatures and has also achieved a
high rate of detection both malicious and legitimate hosts,
with the FPR of 0.2 % and TPR 100 %. Although this
system can detect Botnets regardless of how they perform
malicious activities, it focuses only on P2P Botnet and
cannot detect other types such as IRC or HTTP Bots.
However, the proposed technique is vulnerable with some
of the evasion methods such as flow disturbance packets
and by using the DGA and fast-flux algorithms as a com-
munications facility in order to provide C&C a high level
of privacy.
Liao et al. [24] used a methodology based on packet size
to distinguish between P2P Botnet traffic and legitimate
P2P traffic. They presented the following observations.
Firstly, P2P Bots tries to update information for other Bots
rather than staying idle. Secondly, the Bot mainly transmits
data with a minimum rate of connections. Bayesian net-
works, Naı¨ve Bayes and J48 are used to classify network
traffic. Furthermore, the accuracy rates for the three algo-
rithms are 87, 89 and 98 %, respectively. However, it was
found that the size of P2P Botnet packets is smaller than
that of any other P2P applications.
The detection system introduced by Fedynyshyn et al.
[25] uses a host-based approach to detect Bots using the
property of temporal persistence. They utilized a J48
classifier and a random forest algorithm for sorting various
kinds of Botnet infection categorized according to their
C&C model (HTTP, IRC and P2P). Moreover, they found
similarities in C&C structures for different categories of
Bots that are different from those of legitimate network
traffic.
In 2014, Zhang et al. [26] introduced an approach based
on their previous research in 2011 [21] to enhance the
performance of the system scalability and increase the
efficiency. The method includes two main phases which
are: (1) recognizes all machines that are possibly involved
in P2P connections and extracts statistical fingerprints from
profile P2P traffic, (2) analyses the traffic of P2P hosts to
classify them as P2P bots or legitimate P2P hosts. In the
experiment, P2P applications such as eMule, LimeWire,
Skype and BitTorrent were run on various machines to
generate legitimate traffic. Besides, Waledac and Storm
were run in a controlled environment to generate malicious
network traffic. By using hierarchical clustering of P2P
flows the approach capable of distinguishing legitimate
P2P traffic from P2P Botnet traffic with 100 % detection
rate and 0.2 % false positive detection rate. The significant
advantage of the method is that it is efficient to distinguish
Bots traffic which is overlap within legitimate host traffic
with high detection rates.
Zhao and Traore [27] introduced a P2P Botnet detection
technique based on recognizing the malicious behaviour of
fast-flux networks. They calculate metrics of features from
captured network traffic which are used to identify Botnet
traffic. However, the approach through using decision tree
algorithm achieves high accuracy rates.
In the proposed approach, a decision tree is utilized as a
feature set reduction mechanism to exclude insignificant
features for the endeavour of downsizing the quantities of
data necessary to acquire better classification accuracy rate,
learning rate and reducing in computational time. It
includes a unified method which incorporates classification
and regression trees (CART) [28] and a multilayer feed-
forward neural network with resilient back-propagation
algorithm [29] for the use of P2P Bot detection.
The proposed system uses the header of TCP control
packets to bypass the encrypted network traffic and reduce
the number of packets that will enter to the detection sys-
tem. Moreover, focusing on the connection behaviour will
help the detection system to recognize the Bot behaviour at
an earlier stage when the Bot propagates and tries to con-
tact with other peers to find new updates. Furthermore, the
proposed feature sets are estimated for every connection in
the network to detect any single infect machine. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time that connection-
based features are used in P2P Bot detection. As the fea-
tures are extracted from packets headers, they do not rely
on the packet payloads. With this characteristic, our
detection approach will not be affected by traffic encryp-
tion. Furthermore, the feature sets help the detection sys-
tem to identify P2P Bot infects even single host in the
network.
3 Proposed approach
The proposed framework relies on two fundamental con-
cepts. Firstly, it is passively monitoring network traffic
[12]. Secondly, it utilizes the fact that Bots during the
propagation phase will show frequent communication
behaviours with their C&C servers/peers in order to dis-
cover other peers and receive the latest update of tasks due
to their pre-programmed nature [30, 31]. Bots are different
from other malware in that they work as a group and they
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primarily need a communication channel to coordinate
their malicious activities. These connections are described
as the way by which the Botmaster communicates with his
Bots [9]. The proposed P2P Bot detection uses a multilayer
feed-forward neural network with adaptive learning rate,
since most well-known P2P Bots communicate using TCP
connections [32] such as Waledac Bot [33], Storm Bot
[34], Conficker Bot [35] and Zeus Bot [36, 37]. Therefore,
in this paper features related to TCP connection have been
extracted based on TCP control packets. To increase the
learning rate, a resilient back-propagation algorithm is
used. The resilient back-propagation is considered to be the
best algorithm, measured in terms of convergence speed,
accuracy, robustness and with respect to training parame-
ters [29]. Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the proposed
system.
3.1 Network traffic reduction
Network traffic reduction for detection of malicious
activities is essential for managing enormous amounts of
network traffic where resources are restricted (e.g. mem-
ory, hard disk). The most difficult part of this process is to
identify the behaviour of network traffic by inspecting only
a small number of packets per flow. Therefore, this
research introduces a new traffic reduction technique to
facilitate the deployment of Bot detection systems on high-
speed networks.
The most of the existing Botnet detection systems
[38–41] rely on deep packet inspection (DPI) to analyse
packet content, which is computationally expensive and
inefficient to recognize unknown payload signature [42]. In
DPI, the system is assumed to have access to the payload of
every packet. This technique can be notably accurate when
the payload is not encrypted. However, the majority of new
malware generation applies evasion methods such as
encryption of payload, protocol encapsulation and obfus-
cation [43].
Furthermore, examining all packets on a high-speed
network is an expensive task because the speed of networks
and the amount of the packet transferred via networks are
increasing daily. Thus, the detection system which applies
DPI may suffer from efficiency bounded on processing a
large volume of traffic from high-volume or high-speed
networks [42]. The goal of our work is to increase the
effectiveness of the detection systems by decreasing the
volume of traffic to be analysed, without affecting the
accuracy of the detection process. To achieve this goal, a
novel traffic reduction is proposed for a Bot detection
framework by selecting only TCP control packets. The
framework can efficiently and effectively reduce the
amount of traffic that will be entering into the detection
system. To the best of our knowledge, this first P2P Bot
detection approach applies reduction technique to achieve
the efficiency on Botnet detection domain.
In this study, a filtration of TCP control traffic packets is
used to reduce the volume of network traffic as well as to
increase the performance of the proposed approach. The
filtering includes two steps: filtering all traffics related to
the TCP protocol; then extracting the TCP control packet
SYN, ACK, FIN and RST. Algorithm 1 shows the process
of reduction network traffic from network traces (.PCAP
files). In Line 2, an array of TCP_Control_Packets_list is
initialized. By iterating over the packets, new packets are
added to the array of (TCP_Control_Packets_List) from
Line 3 to 15 till the last packet in the file is reached. Line 4
examines for TCP packet header, and Line 5 selects
packets with no payload data. Line 6 gets the packet
header. From Line 7 to 10, the code reads the packet, which
is TCP, and extracts the packets having SYN, ACK, FIN
and RST flags.
In summary, the network traffic reduction algorithm 3.1
includes six rules to pick the desired packets:
• Rule 1 (R1) Packet contents SYN flag.
• Rule 2 (R2) Packet contents SYN–ACK flag.
• Rule 3 (R3) Packet contents ACK flag.
• Rule 4 (R4) Packet contents FIN–ACK flag.
• Rule 5 (R5) Packet contents Rest–ACK flag.
• Rule 6 (R6) Packet contents Rest flag.
Reduction Reduction 
Feature Extraction
Features Reduction 
(CART)
10 - Features
 Filtering  TCP control 
packets
Training set
Testing set
NN Training 
Learned NN
Detection Bot Connection
Legitimate Connection
Fig. 2 Block diagram of the proposed system
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Algorithm 3.1 Network Traffic Reduction.
1: Procedure reduction (packets)
2: ArrayList <Packet> TCP_Control_Packets_List ;
3: For i=1 to size(Packets)
4: IF Packets(i) has (TCP header)  then
5: IF Packets (i) has (TCP. payloadSize==0) then
6: pktheader= packet.getHeader(Packets(i));
7: IF((pktheader.flags.syn=1OR pktheader.flags.ack=1 OR   
pktheader.flags.rest=1 OR pktheader.flags.fin=1) 
AND NOT (pktheader.flags.cwr=1 OR 
pktheader.flags.ecn=1 OR pktheader.flags.push=1 
OR pktheader.flags.urg=1))
8: TCP_Control_Packets_List.Add(packets(i));
9: ELSE 
10: Discard the Packet;
11: End If 
12: End IF 
13: End IF
14: End For 
15: Return TCP_Control_Packets_list;
16: End procedure
3.2 Feature extraction
In the features extraction phase, the features that are
important in detecting the Bot’s malicious behaviour are
extracted, and these features are collected in 29-tuple
attributes based on 30-s connections. These features are
extracted based on the definition of a connection as a group
of packets exchanged between two different hosts, which
are identified by the 4-tuple (source IP address, destination
IP address, source port and destination port). In our pro-
posed method, all features are extracted directly from the
control packet header, rather than previous approaches
using deep inspection of packet payload content, e.g.
[3, 44–46]. Therefore, performance is increased, and the
use of the system resources such as memory and compu-
tations in the processor is reduced. Table 1 shows the 29
features created in the proposed connections-based P2P Bot
detection approach. These features are generated from a
30-s connection and are composed of a feature vector to
represent the features of a 30-s connection.
3.3 Features reduction
Feature reduction is the technique of reducing the number
of attributes, with the purpose of eliminating those features
from the learning algorithm that have a small influence on
the classification problem [47]. Feature reduction is used to
decrease the ‘over-fitting’ problem [48] and is important to
overcome the imbalance dataset problem [49]. Therefore,
the quality of the feature reduction mechanism is one of the
most important factors that affect the accuracy of the
classification algorithm.
In this study, the aim of feature reduction is to choose a
suitable subset of features, which will improve neural
network performance and decrease the complexity of a
classification model without significantly decreasing
accuracy rates. In this study, a classification and regression
tree (CART) is employed as the feature reduction approach
used to eliminate worthless features, with the aim of
reducing the quantity of data needed to obtain better rates
of neural network learning and classification accuracy.
The decision tree produced by the CART algorithm
consists of two types of node: internal nodes with two
children and leaf nodes without children. Any internal node
is associated with a decision function to indicate which
node to visit next. To begin the construction of the tree, the
training samples that contain a set of features and their
class labels are required. The training set is recursively
divided into smaller subsets during the construction of the
tree. Based on the decision matrix from the distribution of
classes in the training set, each resulting node is assigned a
predicted class. The test at internal nodes is determined
based on a measure of impurity to select which feature and
which threshold values are selected. The best-known
measure of impurity for CART is entropy impurity which
is given by.
E tð Þ ¼ 
XC
j
p
j
t
 
log2 p
j
t
 
ð1Þ
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where E (t) is the entropy impurity at node t, p j
t
 
is the
relative frequency of class j at node t, and c is the number
of classes.
The best value of the split node (t) is chosen from a set
of all values splitting (X), so that the maximum drop in
impurity is a difference between impurity at the root node
and impurity at the children nodes:
DE X; tð Þ ¼ E tð Þ PLE tLð Þ þ PRE tRð Þð Þ ð2Þ
where DE(X, t) is the drop of impurity, E(tL) and E(tR) are
the impurities of the left and right branch nodes, PL and PR
are the percentages of objects go to the left (tL) or right (tR)
child nodes. Table 2 provides a ranking of features’
importance selected by the CART algorithm. The features
F3, F13, F23, F21, F14, F29, F12, F1, F4 and F15 have the
best discrimination of the connections behaviour, whereas
the features F2, F7, F9, F11, F16, F18, F19, F20, F22, F24,
F25, F26, F28 have no discrimination between legitimate
and malicious connections.
ReliefF is generally utilized in the data pre-processing
phase as a feature selection approach. The key idea of the
ReliefF is to evaluate the quality of attributes according to
how well their values discriminate between the instances
that are near to each other [50]. The ReliefF algorithm
essentially consists of three important parts: firstly, esti-
mation of the nearest miss and nearest hit; secondly, esti-
mation of the weight of a feature; thirdly, return a ranked
list of features. The pseudo code of the ReliefF algorithm is
given in Algorithm 2 [51]. Table 2 shows the important
ranking of features estimated by the ReliefF algorithm.
Table 1 Selected features of
network traffic connections
Features Description
F1 Number of control packets per flow in a given time interval
F2 Number of control packets transmitted per flow in a given time interval
F3 Number of control packets received per flow in a given time interval
F4 Number of transmitting bytes per flow in a given time interval
F5 Number of received bytes per flow in a given time interval
F6 Number of transmitted SYN packets per flow in a given time interval
F7 Number of received SYN packets per flow in a given time interval
F8 Number of transmitted ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F9 Number of received ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F10 Number of transmitted duplicate ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F11 Number of received duplicate ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F12 Average length of transmitted control packets per flow in a given time interval
F13 Average length of received control packets per flow in a given time interval
F14 Average length of control packets per flow in a given time interval
F15 Number of transmitted failed connection per flow in a given time interval
F16 Number of received failed connection per flow in a given time interval
F17 Number of transmitted ACK packets have a sequence one per flow in a given time
interval
F18 Number of received ACK packets have a sequence one per flow in a given time
interval
F19 Number of transmitted SYN–ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F20 Number of received SYN–ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F21 Total number of bytes per flow in a given time interval
F22 Ratio of incoming control packets per flow in a given time interval
F23 Ratio of average length of outgoing packets over the average length of control
packets per flow in a given time interval
F24 F6–F20
F25 Number of transmitted FIN–ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F26 Number of received FIN–ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F27 Number of transmitted RST–ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F28 Number of received RST–ACK packets per flow in a given time interval
F29 Average time between an attempt to create connection per flow in a given time
interval
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Algorithm 2 Pseudo code of ReliefF
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
Input: the dataset contains an instance with class labels.
Output: W (f) features ranking.
Number of features = n;
Set all weight W (f)=0;
Number of iterations =m;
For i = 1 to m do
Randomly select an instance Ri;
Find k nearest hit Hi;
Foreach class c <> class (Ri) do
From class c find k nearest misses Mj(c);
End For
For f =1 to n
;
End For
End For
Return W(f);
The principal component analysis (PCA) is a feature
selection and, to be precise, is also a feature reduction
approach. PCA reduces the initial number of features to a
smaller number of uncorrelated features, which are calcu-
lated as the linear combination of the original ones [52].
For instance, each principal component in PCA is the linear
combination of the variables that gives a maximized vari-
ance [53]. The mathematics behind PCA is briefly descri-
bed here.
Given an M 9 N matrix, X, where M is the number of
attributes and N is the number of samples. The mean m of
the training samples (corresponding to a column vector N)
is given:
m ¼ 1
M
XM
i¼1
xi ð3Þ
Centralize the matrix X by subtracting m from each xi.
yi ¼ xi m ð4Þ
Further, the covariance matrix is estimated by
cov ¼ 1
M
XM
i¼1
yi  yiT ð5Þ
Calculate the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix, and then select top k eigenvectors
that correspond to the top k eigenvalues. The top
k principal components are picked that retains 95 % (in
the WEKA machine learning [54]) of the data’s overall
variance.
PCA and ReliefF algorithms have also been used for the
reduction of the feature set from the same set of features,
and a comparison is made of the performances of these
algorithms. The higher ten important features selected by
each algorithm are summarized in Table 3.
3.4 Neural network
The neural network is currently a subject of wide interest.
It has robust capabilities for nonlinear system identification
and control due to an inherent ability to approximate an
arbitrary nonlinear problem [55–57]. The basic architecture
of neural network includes input layer, one or many hidden
layers and output layers. Moreover, every layer contains a
specific number of neurons. The result from any neuron is
used as input to another neuron in the next layer. The link
between neurons has an associated weight. A neural net-
work is trained by giving input and target sets repeatedly.
Each input is given, and the network computes an output.
The neural network outputs are used to determine the
accuracy of results and whether the network is wrong or
right. Whenever wrong, the network has improved the
weight using a back-propagation based on the difference
between the output and desired target of the neural net-
work. After each iteration, the network reduces the error
between output and target.
For the purposes of the present study, the neural network
is trained with a resilient back-propagation learning algo-
rithm, where the use of this algorithm is to minimize the
damaging effects of the volumes of fractional derivatives.
The sign of the derivative is only used to locate the trend of
the weight update, whereas the volume of the derivative
has no negative role overweight update. The size of the
weight change is solely determined by the following for-
mula [29]:
Dw tð Þij ¼
Dij tð Þ; if oE tð Þowij [ 0
þDij tð Þ; if oE tð Þowij \ 0
0; else
8
>>><
>>>:
ð6Þ
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where Dw tð Þij is the change in weight between input layer
and hidden layer by the current iteration (t) and
oE tð Þ
owij
denotes the partial derivative with respect to each weight.
Once the weights are calculated, the new weight updated
value is determined. This is accomplished with the fol-
lowing formula:
D tð Þij ¼
gþ  Dij tð Þ; if oE t  1ð Þowij 
oE tð Þ
owij
[ 0
g  Dij tð Þ; if oE t  1ð Þowij 
oE tð Þ
owij
\ 0
Dij t  1ð Þ; else
8
>><
>>:
ð7Þ
where D tð Þij denotes the updated value for the current iter-
ation t, g? is the positive step value which is typically 1.2,
and g-is the negative step value which is typically 0.5.
The neural network classifier proposed in this study
contains ten input and two output parameters. To avoid
overfitting by using too many hidden layers, the method
proposed in a previous study [28] is used to determine the
number of neurons in hidden layers.
4 Experimental results and analysis
4.1 Dataset
Two datasets that contain malicious and non-malicious
traffic were obtained for use in evaluating our proposed
system. The first is the ISOT dataset [58] that contains
malicious traffic from the French chapter of the Honeynet
Project involving the Waledac and Strom Bots. It also
contains non-malicious traffic collected from the Traffic
Lab at Ericsson Research in Hungary and from the Lawr-
ence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). The second is
the ISCX dataset [59] which includes normal activity and
non-malicious traffic. Table 4 shows the samples of net-
work traces used in the experiment and the evaluation of
the proposed model.
4.2 Experiment
To generate an experimental dataset with both P2P Botnets
traffic and normal legitimate traffic, the trace (.PCAP) files
were replayed using the TcpReplay tool on the same net-
work interface card; then the network traffic was captured
via Wireshark for evaluation. After that, a MATLAB script
was used to generate connections and to extract features
from PCAP file. Connections were then labelled in two
classes of Bot and normal connections. In this work, a
network connection is defined as 4-tuple, with source IP
address, source port number, destination IP address and
destination port number, which have transferred to at least
one packet in both directions.
4.3 Performance evaluation and results
In order to evaluate the rate of accurate detection, N-fold
cross-validation is used to estimate the error rate of classi-
fiers. In N-fold cross-validation, the dataset is partitioned
Table 2 Features importance ranking by CART and ReliefF
CART algorithm ReliefF algorithm
Feature Importance Feature Importance
F3 100 F27 0.08668
F13 69.77551 F25 0.031391
F23 58.82751 F15 0.026481
F21 14.94384 F6 0.026306
F14 2.900449 F22 0.02497
F29 0.794777 F24 0.024034
F12 0.384592 F29 0.023641
F1 0.120902 F23 0.016308
F4 0.082941 F26 0.013599
F15 0.069167 F19 0.011077
F6 0.012049 F14 0.008974
F5 0.01191 F13 0.004725
F27 0.01153 F12 0.004475
F10 0.000515 F28 0.004378
F8 3.81E-06 F18 0.004236
F17 6.12E-09 F3 0.003006
F2 0 F1 0.002928
F7 0 F9 0.002817
F9 0 F20 0.002746
F11 0 F4 0.002391
F16 0 F8 0.002162
F18 0 F2 0.002123
F19 0 F21 0.001838
F20 0 F17 0.001292
F22 0 F11 0.00126
F24 0 F10 0.001083
F25 0 F5 0.00054
F28 0 F16 0
F26 0 F7 0
Table 3 Feature reduction with the CART, PCA and ReliefF
algorithms
Feature selection
algorithm
Features
number
Feature list
CART 10 F3, F13, F23, F21, F14, F29,
F12, F1, F4, F15
PCA 10 Linear combination of features
ReliefF 10 F27, F25, F15, F6, F22, F24,
F29, F23, F26, F19
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randomly into N samples and evaluations run for N itera-
tions. In each iteration,N-1 samples are selected for training
and the final sample is used to evaluate the accuracy of the
classifier. N = 10 was selected in conducting the experi-
ments. The performance of the proposed model is compared
with that of the PCA and ReliefF algorithm as others feature
selection approaches. To evaluate the performance of the
neural network recognition system, measures such as false
positive rate, true positive rate, accuracy, precision, recall
and the F-measure are calculated as follows:
– True positive (TP) the number of malicious behaviours
correctly detected as malicious activities.
– True negative (TN) the number of normal behaviours
correctly detected as normal activities.
– False positive (FP) the number of normal behaviours
detected as malicious activities.
– False negative (FN) the number of malicious beha-
viours detected as normal activities.
False positive rate (FPR) shows the percentage of
legitimate instances misclassified as Bot instances.
FPR ¼ FP
TNþ FPð Þ ð8Þ
Detection rate (DR), also called recall, indicates the
percentage of Bot instances that were predicted as Bot
instances.
DR ¼ TP
TPþ FNð Þ ð9Þ
Accuracy indicates the percentage of correct predictions
of all instances.
Accuracy ¼ TPþ TNð Þ
TPþ TNþ FPþ FNð Þ ð10Þ
Precision indicates the percentage of instances correctly
classified as a positive instance.
Precision ¼ TP
TPþ FPð Þ ð11Þ
F-measure: a measure of a test’s accuracy. It considers
both the precision and the recall of the test to compute the
score.
F-measure ¼ 2 Precision Recallð Þ
Precisionþ Recallð Þ ð12Þ
The results obtained demonstrate that the proposed
approach gives the highest detection and accuracy rate with
the neural network at around 99 %. The features based on
the PCA algorithm gave lower accuracy and detection rates
than the other approaches at around 93 and 91 %, respec-
tively, as shown in Table 5.
Figure 3 gives the FPR, precision rate andF-measure of the
Bot detection system using the various feature selection
approaches with the same set of TCP features. The results
show that the highest average F-measure rate was 98.32 % for
the proposed methodology, while the lowest F-measure rate
was 87.93 % for the PCA algorithm. Moreover, the proposed
approach gave the lowest false positive rate of around 0.75 %.
To test the efficiency of our proposed approach in
detecting P2P Bots, the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve is plotted to show the trade-off between TPR
and FPR. A perfect classifier would have an area under
curve (AUC) close to 1.0. The x-axis represents a FPR, and
the y-axis represents a TPR. As shown in Fig. 4, the area
under curve (AUC) is 0.994 for the TCP control packet
feature selection based on CART with the neural network.
It is found that the proposed approach performs well in
classifying P2P Bot connection traffic based on TCP con-
trol packets in a 30-s time interval.
The computational time of each feature selection algo-
rithms is estimated to measure the performance of algo-
rithms as expected in actual situation deployment. Also, we
measure the neural network computational time that
Table 4 Datasets selected
Traffic type Duration (s) Number of
packets
Number of
control packets
Number of
connections
Storm Bot traffic 3115 128,241 64,551 5423
Waledac Bot traffic 605 118,379 49,536 4535
Normal traffic (ISCX) 9511 419,659 165,218 11,088
Normal traffic (LBNL) 126,273 564,999 166,308 12,001
Table 5 Neural network results with CART subset, ReliefF subset and PCA
Classifier Proposed approach ReliefF PCA
Neural network Accuracy rate Detection rate Accuracy rate Detection rate Accuracy rate Detection rate
99.20 99.08 97.37 93.77 91.06 93.23
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required to train it per second based on the subset of fea-
tures that obtained from features selection algorithm. These
analyses were conducted on 3.00 GHz Intel i7 running
Windows 8.1 operating system.
Table 6 provides a comparison of all the features
selection algorithm. The decision tree (CART) achieves the
minimum time on selection subset of features than other
technique using the same dataset as shown in Table 6.
Table 7 shows the comparison of the build time (train-
ing time) of neural network models based on features
selection subset. The CART algorithm achieved the best
results for neural network training time compared with
ReliefF subset and PCA. However, the maximum time is
based on the subset of features that obtained from ReliefF
algorithm.
The main advantage of the suggested approach is
reduction network traffic technique that it reduces 60 % of
the input packets and retains high detection rates as well as
low false positive rate. The bottleneck of the neural net-
work model for Bot detection is the dimensionality and the
size of the dataset considered because the amount of the
packets that a detection system requires to scan is very
large. Therefore, this study proposes a reduction network
traffic approach to reduce the size of network traffic and
utilize decision tree to reduce the features dimensionality.
Additionally, the feature set used in the proposed system
represents connection behaviour that helps to detect Bots in
the early phase of their life cycle before they begin mali-
cious activities. Moreover, to bypass the encrypted network
traffic, connections-based detection mechanism was
designed which utilizes the information in the header of
TCP control packets. Thus, it cannot be confused by pay-
load encryption techniques. The performance of the pro-
posed approach was tested using real network traffic and is
compared with some of the existing P2P Bot detection
techniques.
Compared with other approaches, the proposed
approach reduces the amount of processing required to
increase performance. It is not easy to compare different
Botnet detection approaches because each uses different
datasets and Botnet samples in the experiments. Therefore,
the proposed approach is compared with another detection
approach based on accuracy, detection and false positive
rates. Table 8 shows the results of the comparison of our
results with those in other published work based on the
analysis of network traffic to detect P2P Botnets. The
table also demonstrates that the accuracy and false positive
rates using the proposed approach are better than those
gained by previous solutions. Moreover, due to its design,
our solution is able to detect single Bot infections and it is
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Table 6 Features selection algorithm computation time
Features selection
algorithm
CART ReliefF PCA
Time (s) 2.5 113 4.9
Table 7 Neural network training time with CART subset, ReliefF
subset and PCA
Neural network
training time
CART features
subset
ReliefF features
subset
PCA features
subset
Time (s) 23 29 25
Table 8 Comparison with other published approaches
Approaches FPR % Accuracy %
Fedynyshyn et al. [25] 7.8 92.9
Wen-Hwa et al. [24] 0 98
Proposed approach 0.75 99.20
Bold entries relate to the results achieved by the technique proposed
in this paper
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not necessary to associate activity among multiple hosts
during the detection phase, as in the case with TAMD [60],
BotMiner [39] and BotSniffer [38]. On the other hand,
several existing schemes [40, 61] support the detection of
individual Bot infections, but they use DPI. In contrast, our
solution needs only information about network connec-
tions; it does not examine payload content. Therefore, it is
immune to Botnets that use encryption methods. However,
the present approach can detect P2P Bots and classify the
host connections as legitimate or malicious. A limitation of
the proposed research is that it only considers TCP traffic
to detect Botnet traffic. Therefore, if Botnets use UDP
packets for communication, this may not be detected by the
proposed approach. In the future, thus proposed approach
will be improved to have the ability to discover the Botnets
that utilize the UDP protocol for communication.
There are four principal difficulties in the detection of
Botnet behaviour: firstly, the network traffic is continuous,
which indicates that it is persistent and features will change
over time. Furthermore, Botnets dynamically change via
Bot updates or altering their operation in various life cycle
stages after receiving instructions from a Botmaster. These
phenomena are termed concept drift, and this is currently a
serious issue for any detection methods [62]. Secondly,
there is always the risk of a new Botnet emerging on a
network and spread the malicious behaviour stealthily.
Moreover, the behaviour of an infected host might seem
like legitimate behaviour, and it is difficult to detect
malicious activities if the classifier was not trained for this
behaviour previously. Thirdly, evaluating the entire net-
work traffic in real-time is a computationally expensive
task due to the speed of network traffic. Finally, the
availability of up-to-date Botnet traffic dataset remains a
key challenge in detection of Botnets. The universality and
precision of the classifier depend on the training datasets
quality. The available Botnet dataset is formed in academic
experiment source due to the security and privacy issue,
and it is hard for the researcher to get a Botnet traces from
other such as corporate networks.
5 Conclusion and future work
A joint classification and regression tree (CART) algorithm
and neural network have been presented to detect P2P Bot
connections. The implementation of the CART–NN requires
two sequential steps. Firstly, CART is applied to choose the
suitable features important in detecting Bots. Secondly, the
result of CART features subset is employed to produce the
input layer of the neural network. The proposed method is
based on features extracted fromTCP control packet headers
during 30-s connections between two hosts; thus, it can be
used to detect P2P Bot without relying on packet payload, IP
address, port number and encrypted traffic. The performance
of the proposed detection technique is compared with fea-
tures selection approach like PCA, ReliefF algorithms.
Experimental results show that the proposed DT–NN
method achieved high accuracy rates with lower false posi-
tive rates. In the future, we plan to extend our approach to
real-time systems by adding an unsupervised learning
approach to select the most relevant features that would
further increase accuracy and performance.
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